Abstract: This paper documents the short-term and long-term trends in internal conflict in South Asian countries, using multiple data sources. I find that incidents of terrorism have been rising across South Asia over the past decade, and this increase has been concentrated in economically lagging regions in the post-2001 period. This is in contrast to both the historical patterns of conflict, and the evolution of other types of violence. Analyzing the role of economic, geographic and demographic factors, I find that poorer areas have significantly higher levels of conflict intensity. The paper reviews the various approaches taken by governments to deal with conflict, contrasting security-based approaches with political accommodation and economic approaches. Finally, the paper reviews the potential role of regional cooperation in mitigating conflict.
Introduction
South Asia is a violent place. In 2007, there were 3607 incidents of terrorist violence in South Asia, which claimed the lives of 4737 people. This represents a quarter of all terrorist attacks worldwide, second only to Iraq. 2 In this chapter, I document the extent of internal conflict within the countries of South Asia and over time. This is the first comprehensive analysis of internal conflict in South Asia, using multiple data sources and also incorporating a long-run time frame.
I find three distinct trends in the data. I then consider several potential explanatory variables to explain the regional distribution of conflict, many of which have been found to be significantly associated with the incidence of conflict in previous cross-country and within-country studies. These include geographical factors which favor insurgency, economic factors such as poverty, social diversity, and institutional factors such as poor property rights. District-level regressions for India and Nepal show a strong 2 National Counterterrorism Center (2007), p 21. 3 I will be using the words "internal conflict," "terrorist violence" and "terrorism" interchangeably in this chapter.
There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism; Section 2 discusses the exact definitions used in the data. The key distinction here is that I do not analyze instances of inter-state conflict, such as the armed conflict in Kargil between India and Pakistan in 1999. correlation between the incidence of poverty and the intensity of conflict, over and above the impact of geographical factors like altitude or the presence of forests. This is consistent with the trend of rising conflict in lagging areas, and provides further evidence of the link between economic backwardness and violence. We should note that we cannot directly infer causality from these relationships, but the evidence is suggestive nevertheless.
The last part of the chapter focuses on the measures implemented by regional and national governments to combat internal violence. These measures vary considerably across countries and over time. I review security-based approaches currently being followed by many South Asian countries, as well as economic and political accommodation approaches. Typically, the use of military force or relying on unofficial militias has not proved to be a successful counter-insurgency tactic in South Asia, while strengthening police activity and using a political accommodation approach has yielded some successes in the past. Finally, I review the role of regional cooperation in mitigating conflict, and the potential implications of the November 2008 terrorist attacks on Mumbai.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data sources for this study and Section 3 describes the main trends in internal conflict in different South Asian countries. Section 4 examines whether lagging regions are more prone to internal conflict, and
Section 5 generalizes the analysis by looking at the relationship of conflict intensity with several geographic, economic and demographic variables. Section 6 reviews the varying national and regional approaches to conflict, Section 7 considers the potential impact of the terrorist attacks on Mumbai in November 2008, and Section 8 concludes.
Data on Internal Conflict in South Asia
Any empirical analysis of terrorism or conflict is complicated by data constraints and the lack of a universally accepted definition of conflict. I use multiple data sources in my analysis, and focus on the common trends I observe across these data sets. These data have been put together by several different organizations, each of which employs their own definition, counting methodologies, data sources and time periods (see Tables 1 and 2 for details); the trends we detail are therefore not strictly dependent on specific definitions or data collection methodologies.
The primary cross-country data sets I use are the Global Terrorism Database 2 (GTD2), covering the period 1998-2004, and the Rand-MIPT Terrorism database (MIPT). The GTD2 data base employs a fairly specific definition of "terrorism," covering acts of intentional violence perpetrated by subnational non-state actors. Further, the acts must satisfy two of the following three criteria: they must be aimed at attaining a specific political, economic, religious or social goal, there must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate or convey some message to a larger audience than the immediate victims and/or the actions must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. Two caveats are immediately obvious from this description: this methodology requires several judgment calls to be made, notably about the intentions of the perpetrators, and this database explicitly excludes incidents of state-caused violence. This data base consists of high-quality data, only including incidents confirmed by multiple independent open-source reports (or a single "high-quality" source), and is specifically designed to be comparable over time. The biggest downside is the limited time frame, 1998-2004; in fact, as detailed below, several South Asian countries have experienced an increase in internal violence after 2004.
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The MIPT database employs a slightly broader definition of terrorism. The motives of all terrorists are assumed to be political, and terrorism includes all violence calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take. Acts of terrorism are generally directed against civilian targets, and carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. The data is put together from newspaper, TV or radio reports, and there is no requirement for incidents to be confirmed by multiple data sources. I have obtained this data over 1998-2007, a longer time period than the GTD2.
In addition to these, the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center also collects data on , and also includes incidents of communal violence. Looking across the countries of South Asia, we see somewhat different trends. In India, we see a steady rise in conflict incidents after 2001, with a dramatic increase after 2004. This trend is observed in all the three datasets for which we have data from India (GTD2, MIPT, MHA) ( Figure 1C ). This is mainly due to an increase in incidents of left-wing extremism, concentrated in central India, and an increase in terrorist incidents in India's cities. Regarding the other South 7
Asian countries, an increase in conflict incidents is apparent for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nepal after 2001 ( Figure 1D 
India
There are three main sources of internal conflict in India. First, there are long-running separatist movements in several north-eastern states (Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, Tripura); all of these states have been classified as "lagging" for the purposes of this report. Figure 1C ). This is an important finding, because it means that the recent increase in conflict cannot be attributed to a general decline in law and order or an overall deterioration of state capacity. In particular, it suggests that events outside the country or region might have played a role in increasing the incidence of conflict in South Asia. One such potential factor is the growing global reach of terrorist organizations, demonstrated most tragically in the events of September 11, 2001.
Afghanistan
Conflict has been a feature of life in Afghanistan since King Zahir Shah was deposed in Figure 1D ).
In the most recent years (2007 and 2008) , there has also been a shift in the tactics used: from large-scale armed attacks towards attacks explicitly targeting non-combatants, and an increasing number of suicide attacks. This has resulted in an expansion of the areas designated as "no-go" or "high abduction risk" by the United Nations. Opium cultivation has increased steadily, and has also moved more into the eastern and southern Taliban-dominated regions, providing them a useful source of revenue (Cordesman, 2008) . 
Pakistan
Pakistan experienced a significant increase in terrorist attacks in the years after 2004 ( Figure   1D ). These come from two main sources. The first consists of violent incidents perpetrated by 
Sri Lanka
In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has been conducting an armed campaign for a separate Tamil homeland since the early 1980s. The LTTE is a highly trained and motivated terrorist group, one of the most formidable in the world. These Tamil Figure 3C ). This has been declining in 16 Regions have been defined as "lagging" or "leading" based on per capita income levels in 2004. According to this criterion, the lagging regions are as follows: the states of Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand and West Bengal in India; the North West Frontier Provinces, Balochistan and FATA in Pakistan; all regions except Dhaka in Bangladesh; all provinces except the Western Province in Sri Lanka, and the entire countries of Afghanistan and Nepal. 17 All data from India exclude the state of Jammu and Kashmir, since the conflict in that region cannot be classified as a purely internal conflict due to the involvement of Pakistan. The state is also governed under special constitutional provision and has a large army presence, making it not comparable to the situation in the other states.
leading regions after 2005, presumably reflecting the lower levels of terrorist activity in those areas, while it displays a sustained rise in lagging regions.
The divergence in conflict between lagging regions and leading ones is reflected more formally in statistical t-tests (Table 3) . Overall, these suggest that the differences we observed in Figures 2 and 3 are statistically significant i.e. are greater than what we would observe by random chance. In South Asia as a whole, lagging regions experienced more than three times the number of terrorist incidents per capita, as compared to leading regions, and almost twice as many deaths per capita in such incidents (Table 3 , Panel A, first two lines). This is a very large difference and remains statistically significant even after controlling for changes which impacted the whole region in any given year.
18
Some of this difference is attributable to cross-country differences: Afghanistan and Nepal, both lagging regions, suffered very high levels of conflict during this period. But, consistent with the results in Figure 2C , we see that the difference between lagging and leading regions is present within individual countries as well: lagging regions within Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka all have more than twice the levels of per capita conflict than leading regions within the same countries.
Using a different data set provides evidence for the robustness of these results. The GTD2 data set also shows lagging regions with significantly higher conflict levels than leading ones (Table 3 , Panel B). Interestingly, the within country results are much weaker in this data set, which extends only till 2004. This is consistent with the widening differences observed between lagging and leading regions after 2004.
Trends in Conflict before 1998
Before going on to analyze the spatial incidence of internal conflict at a more micro level, I examine the evolution of terrorism in South Asia for a longer time period. I use the long-term data sets GTD1 and PITF for this purpose (see Tables 1 and 2 for details of these data sets).
I find that the incidence of conflict varies considerably across regions and over time.
Incidents of terrorist violence increased in South Asia as a whole during the late 1980s ( Figure   4A ), mainly driven by the Tamil separatist movement in Sri Lanka and the separatist movement in the western Indian state of Punjab. By the early 1990s, both these movements had suffered major setbacks from government forces, and consequently, terrorism in South Asia was lower. In the mid-1990s, incidents of terrorism began to increase again, but this time driven by increases in
Pakistan and the separatist movements in the northeastern states of India. The trends in terrorism-related deaths mirror those in the number of incidents ( Figure 4B ). Overall, our analysis indicates that internal conflict is rising in South Asia in the new millennium. In the period after 2001, it is the economically lagging regions which bear the brunt of such violence. However, this was not always the case in previous decades.
What Factors Explain the Variation in Conflict Intensity Across Regions?
In this section, I draw upon the existing empirical literature on conflict to identify potential variables to explain the variation in conflict intensity across regions. Do lagging regions suffer more conflict because of unfavorable geography, because they are economically backward, or because they have more divided societies and poorer institutional quality? These factors are, of course, not mutually exclusive, so the exercise here is mainly to see which of these factors matters more in an empirical way.
Most of the cross-country literature on the incidence of civil war shows that poor countries are at greater risk of internal conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003) . The latter study also finds that geographical conditions which favor insurgency, such as the presence of forest cover, is significantly associated with the incidence of conflict. Do and Iyer (2007) find similar results in an analysis of conflict intensity across the districts of Nepal. Many policy makers cite the lack of economic opportunities, and specifically the extent of landlessness, as a primary determinant of the Naxalite conflict in India. 19 Time series studies of conflict also find that economic circumstances matter. Miguel, Satyanath and Sargenti (2004) find that civil war is more likely to begin in African countries in years following poor rainfall. In a similar vein, Hidalgo et al (2008) find that poor rainfall is associated with an increased incidence of land invasions in Brazil, and Dube and Vargas (2007) document a robust association between reduced coffee prices and the incidence of terrorism in Columbia.
In addition to economic and geographic circumstances, social divisions are often cited as a driver of conflict. For instance, the separatist movement in Sri Lanka began with the demands of ethnic Tamils for greater autonomy. Similarly, the Maoist rebels in Nepal often claim to be fighting on behalf of marginalized sections of society, such as members of the lower castes.
India's northeastern states, which are the scene of long-running separatist movements, are also socially and ethnically different from the majority of the states in India.
In this section, we examine some correlations between the incidence of conflict and the geographic, economic and societal characteristics of South Asian regions. Table 4 summarizes the correlations of the number of incidents and number of fatalities in terrorist incidents with demographic variables (population density, urbanization, literacy rates) and economic variables (% of population in poverty). Consistent with the idea that economic backwardness matters, we find a negative correlation between conflict intensity and measures of literacy and urbanization; however, we do not see the expected positive correlation with poverty (Table 4 , Panel A).
Breaking out the results for India alone, we do see a positive correlation with poverty (and conversely, a negative one with per capita income) as well as a significant positive correlation with the extent of forest cover (Table 4 , Panel B). While these are suggestive, I perform multiple regression analysis to estimate the effect of all these factors jointly.
The specification I use is as follows:
where Conflict j is either the number of conflict incidents or conflict-related deaths (normalized by population) in region j, X j is a vector of economic, demographic and geographic characteristics, and e j is an error term. These regressions are run using district-level data on conflict intensity for India and Nepal.
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The regression results show that poorer districts have a significantly greater incidence of conflict in both India and Nepal (Table 5 ). The magnitude of the coefficient on poverty is quite large: an increase in poverty by 10 percentage points is associated with a 0.14 standard deviation increase in conflict intensity, or 0.26 incidents of conflict per district (Table 5 , column 1). This is quite high compared to the mean level of 0.77 incidents per district. In terms of conflict fatalities, a 10 percentage point increase in poverty is associated with a 0.11 standard deviation increase in conflict-related deaths or 0.39 more deaths for an average district (compared to the mean level of 0.60 deaths per district). For Nepal, the impact of poverty is much higher: a 10 percentage point increase in district poverty is associated with 23-25 additional conflict-related deaths. The presence of mountains and forest cover are also significant predictors of conflict intensity in Nepal (Table 5 , Column 5).
I also included proxy measures of social diversity and institutional quality in the regression analysis. Social diversity is proxied by the relative presence of members from disadvantaged groups in the population (fraction of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Muslims in India, 20 Multiple regression analysis at the level of the region is hampered by the small number of observations. District level regressions for Sri Lanka is unlikely to yield useful conclusions both because of small sample size (25 districts total) and the non-availability of data on several key variables for the most conflict-affected areas. I do not have district level data on most variables for Pakistan.
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fraction of lower castes in Nepal). Institutional quality is proxied by a measure of historical property rights based on whether the land tenure was historically controlled by landlords (see Banerjee and Iyer (2005) that this variable is significantly related to technology adoption and productivity in India). This is most relevant for the Naxalite conflict which is primarily driven by demands for land redistribution. Areas with lower historical land inequality have a lower incidence of conflict in India (Table 5 , Columns 1-4), but the relationship is not statistically significant. The presence of disadvantaged minorities is not significantly associated with conflict intensity in either of these countries.
In sum, we find some evidence to support the hypothesis that factors which reduce the cost of insurgency (lower incomes, presence of forests) are significantly associated with the incidence of conflict, while factors such as social or religious divides are less important.
How can Countries Deal with Internal Conflict?

The Security Approach
The most common approach to deal with insurgencies, terrorism or internal violence is to use the usual police forces to establish law and order in the affected areas. However, the police forces in South Asian countries tend to under-staffed and under-equipped. For instance, India has less than 150 police personnel per 100,000 people, while the United States has about 300. 100,000 armed forces in the FATA region, and violence has escalated since that time.
The Military Approach
In extreme cases, when police forces turn out to be insufficient, the armed forces are called in to deal with the insurgency. In most cases, this has not proved to be a successful strategy in In Pakistan, the use of armed forces has had some successes to its credit. For instance, the local insurgency in Balochistan has been considerably scaled down after the assassination of reached a peaceful political accommodation with their government; 10% of insurgent groups achieved victory and only 7% of terrorist groups were eliminated by military action (Jones and Libicki, 2008) .
The Political Approach
A different approach to dealing with insurgencies is to conduct negotiations and sign peace agreements with the insurgents. This needs two (seemingly obvious) conditions to be effective:
first, the government must do this in a coordinated way and have the intention of fulfilling at least some of the insurgents' demands. The peace talks between the government of Andhra Pradesh and the People's War Group (PWG) in 2004 were undermined by the fact that other states were conducting counter-terrorism raids against the PWG at the same time. Similarly, the proposed talks with the ULFA in Assam have floundered because the ULFA wanted the sovereignty of Assam to be on the agenda, which the Indian government did not agree to. In contrast, the limited autonomy desired by the Bodo militant groups was discussed and ultimately granted.
The second precondition for effective talks is for the insurgent group to be seriously interested in joining the political mainstream. This is not the case in many South Asian conflicts.
For instance, the insurgent groups in India's Manipur state have not expressed any interest in holding talks. In Sri Lanka, the LTTE claims that it was "compelled by unprecedented historical circumstances to participate in peace talks with the Sinhala state." 24 Other Tamil militant organizations, like the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), have been successfully brought into the political mainstream, but the LTTE has refused all offers of devolution of power. In fact, the LTTE enforced a boycott of the 2005 elections in the areas it controlled, which contributed to a narrow victory for the hawkish Mahinda Rajapakse, who had already indicated his intention of ending the ceasefire with the LTTE. This suggests that the LTTE were not averse to having a hardliner in power, and to a further escalation of conflict.
The Economic Approach
Complementary to the security-based solution is an economic solution, whereby the government tries to spur economic development in the conflict-affected areas with a view to undercut the support for the insurgency. This is consistent with the view of economic Of course, the challenge is to make sure that these funds are used in a constructive manner.
An alternative strategy is to deliver the services the insurgents blame the government for not providing. For instance, the government of Andhra Pradesh distributed more than 300,000 acres of land to poor people in 2005, and has since followed it up with two further phases of land distribution. A related step is the enactment of new legislation which seeks to recognize the 27 forest rights and vest the occupation of forest land in members of the Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers whose rights had not been recorded previously. 26 Given the previously observed correlation between the extent of forest cover and the intensity of conflict (Table 4) , this promises to be a positive step towards reducing support for Naxalite movements.
A similar strategy is to offer generous terms for the surrender and rehabilitation of insurgents. The government of India offers a monthly stipend of Rs. 2000, free vocational training and a lump sum of Rs 150,000 to insurgents in the northeastern states. This has had only limited success: 524 insurgents surrendered in 2007, compared to 579 who were killed by security forces.
Are such economically oriented incentives effective in reducing conflict? In general, it is hard to quantify the impact of such measures on the intensity of conflict, partly because of the paucity of data on exact amounts allocated at the very local level. A preliminary analysis of district-level data from Iraq finds that greater service provision by the government does result in a decline in insurgency (Berman, Shapiro and Felter, 2008) . There is also evidence that insurgents take both economic factors and political signals into account when planning attacks: Iyengar and Monten (2008) find that insurgent attacks in Iraq show an increase whenever leading US policymakers make statements critical of the war. The latter analysis suggests that the public statements of policy makers are of particular importance in dealing with insurgencies. The Indian government's focus on a "holistic approach" incorporating "security, development, administration and public perception management" thus appears to be the right strategy to counter internal conflict. In sum, while there is considerable potential for regional cooperation in reducing conflict, this has been an underutilized strategy in combating terrorism in South Asia. A variety of different approaches have been tried by South Asian governments to counter terrorism. Reviewing these approaches in the South Asian and global context, it appears that using the armed forces or local militias have not been especially effective in combating terrorism. Strengthening police forces or conducting negotiations to induce insurgents to join the political mainstream appear to be more effective approaches. Economic incentives or development programs can be useful complements to this political accommodation approach.
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